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THE EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES IN THE
UNITED NATIONS SUBCOMMISSION ON
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
INTRODUCTION

Each year, the Secretary General of the United Nations receives
thousands of communications1 from individuals throughout the world
alleging violations by their governments of human rights. In 1970, the
Economic and Social Council adopted Resolution 1503 which established a mechanism for handling these communications. 2 The resolution authorized the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter referred to as the Subcommission], inter alia, to appoint a working group to consider the communications and bring to the attention of the Subcommission those
which "appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 3 Resolution 1503 also directed the Subcommission to devise "appropriate
procedures for dealing with the question of admissibility of communications." 4 One year later, the Subcommission adopted two resolutions outlining the procedure to be followed, including the significant
provision that "communications shall be inadmissible if domestic
remedies have not been exhausted." 5
1. In a 13 month span during 1951-52 there were 25,279 communications. 8
Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report, 14 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 4, at
42-43, U.N. Doe. E/2256 (1952). During a 10 month period in 1952-53 there were
2,118 communications. 9 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report, 14 U.N.
ECOSOC, Supp. 8, at 38, U.N. Doc. E/2447 (1953). And in 1970-71 the yearly rate
was about 14,000. 24 Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Summary Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 24
Subcommission Report]. When the working group first met, in August 1972, it examined more than 20,000 communications, and in August 1973 it examined more than
7,000 communications received in the previous 12 months. Niset, La Sous-Commission de la Lutte Contre les Measures Discriminatoires et de la Protection des Minorities
des Nations Unies a sa Vingt-Sixieme Session [Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session of
the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities], 6
REVUE DEs DRoITs im 'iHoME 565, 589 (1973).
2. Economic and Social Council Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1A, at
8-9, U.N. Doe. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ECOSOC Res. 1503].
3. Id. para. 1, at 8.
4. Id. para. 2.
5. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 4(b), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1,
at 51.
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One assumes that the domestic remedies rule has been incorporated into the Subcommission's procedure for a purpose, but that
purpose remains unclear. The domestic remedies rule is a fixture of
customary international law. 6 It was born in a commercial world for
the protection of states confronted with suits by other states espousing
claims of their nationals7 and is still applied in that context. The
rule is also recognized today in the procedure of international human
rights bodies which handle claims of nationals against their own
governments. 8 The relief sought in commercial claims is generally
money; 9 in human rights cases, it is generally life or liberty. 10
6. Switzerland-United States Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6, 27; A.

FREEDAN,

THE INTERNATIONAL :REspoNsmILrry OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 410 nn.2&3
(1970); T. HAESLER, THE ExHAUSTION OF LOCAL REmEDIES IN THE CASE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 18-20 (1968); C. LAW, TEE LOCAL REMEDIES
RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1961). Contra, C. LAW, supra at 141-42 (discussing
the views of others).

7. For a history of international claims, see F. DAWvSON & I.

HEAD, INTERNATIONAL

LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS & THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 1-26 (1971); A. FREEMAN,
supra note 6, at 403-17; C. LAw, supra note 6, at 15-19.

8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
arts. 26, 27(3), in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COLLECTED TEXTS §

1

(7th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]; Statute of the Inter-Amerlcan Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. 10, art. 9(his) (d). OEA/Ser.L/V/II.26
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Statute]; Regulations of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, O.A.S. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17, Doc. 26 at 10 [hereinafter cited as
Regulations]; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46(1) (a), O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36 at 1-21, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser.A/16, English, (signed Nov.
1969, not yet in force); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civilian
and Political Rights, arts. 2, 5(2) (b), G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at
59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 14(7) (a), G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
14, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
9. The principal contact between aliens and respondent governments is commercial and the injuries generally involve a breach of contract or confiscation. See
materials cited note 7 supra. Many cases are handled by domestic courts and include
a denial of justice in addition to an initial injury. In the latter instance, the claim
is based partially on civil and political rights, but the original (substantive) injury is
economic and the remedy is generally reparation rather than restitution. A. FREE.MAN,
supra note 6, at 571-78. In cases of maltreatment or arbitrary arrest, diplomatic interposition usually ends the substantive injury and the issue before the international
tribunal is compensation. For an early case involving both the civil/political and economic injuries, see Finlay, Pacifico and Other British Claims against Greece, (1850),
summarized in L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUfAN
RIGHTS 40 (1973). There are indications in customary international law that states
have been held more strictly liable for denial of justice where individual liberties are
at stake. A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 82-83.
10. Although the Universal Declaration contains economic as well as civil and
political rights, international human rights bodies deal principally with alleged violations of civil and political rights. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 8; The
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There are serious problems facing the individual who attempts
domestic remedies for a violation of human rights by his government.
Because governmental authority is being challenged, the pursuit of
justice is likely to be futile; furthermore, the individual may be
placing himself in great personal danger, especially where the allegations are of gross violations." For these reasons, it should be unacceptable to apply the exhaustion rule without allowing some flexibility; there should be an exception for the injured party who proves
the futility of attempting domestic remedies. Indeed, customary international law places great importance on such an exception.' Generally, the plaintiff is given an opportunity to defeat the presumption
that effective remedies exist by producing evidence of judicial precedent, administrative practice or legislation that indicates a government policy to deny justice in circumstances substantially similar to
those facing the plaintiff. 3 While this requirement of proof is not an
insurmountable obstacle for the educated, rich plaintiff in commercial cases, it is for the poor and uneducated victim of a violation of
human rights, 4 as has been demonstrated by the experience of inInternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 8, at 47; Statute art. 9(bis) (a), supra note 8.
11. The exact meaning of the term is far from settled. In 1973 some members
of the Commission on Human Rights expressed the view that attention in the Subcommission should be focused on 'mass violations, such as apartheid, racism and
colonialism," while others mentioned instances of police and military brutality, torture
and measures affecting rights of minority groups. 29 Commission on Human Rights,
Summary Report, 54 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 6, at 46, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1127 (1973).
By both definitions, the allegations represent a serious threat to the legitimacy of the
respondent government and it can be assumed that such threats are not made without
danger to the petitioner. Along this line, it should be added that most governments in
the world are so sensitive about their sovereignty that they do not allow judicial review of legislative or executive authority. See note 46 infra.
12. The exception has always been closely associated with the principle of equity.
One scholar wrote that "it has always been considered unreasonable and iniquitous to
require an individual to exhaust local remedies without exceptions." T. HAESLER, supra
note 6, at 49. He went even further and said the exception "shows the clear features
of an independent legal principle within the rule." Id. at 33. C. Jenks agreed: "the
principle on which it [the rule] rests is valid vnly subject to certain exceptions ....
"
C. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 424 (1964)
(emphasis
added). Another writer emphasizes the flexibility of the domestic remedies rule: "[flt
is not a mechanical device ...." A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 423. See also A. FREEMAN, at 417-18; C. LAW, supra note 6, at 67-73; text accompanying notes 85-95 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 36-84 infra.
14. For discussion of the particular needs of poor and uneducated plaintiffs in

human rights cases, see P.

DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RiGHTS

112-13 (1965);

Schaffer & Weissbrodt, Exhaustion of Remedies in the Context of the Racial Discrimination Convention, 2 REvuE DES DROITS DE L'HomME 632, 633-34 (1969); text accompanying note 133 infra.
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dividual claimants before the two operative regional human rights
bodies. 15 Presumably, it would be true in the Subcommission as well,
where the victims are often from a deprived socio-economic background. 16 Thus, the victim of a human rights violation is caught
between the danger of attempting domestic remedies and the difficulty of proving the futility of attempting these remedies.
At times in cases before traditional international courts and
tribunals and the regional human rights bodies, a number of similar
complaints are grouped together into a single package before being
considered by the international organ. 17 In the United Nations, the
Subcommission deals only with packages of petitions.' 8 The theory
on which individual petitions are packaged together is that they reveal a "consistent pattern;" such a pattern necessarily contains substantially similar allegations. The packages, as a result, contain a
great deal of information that could be very helpful to any one of
the individual claimants. For instance, some individuals might have
had experience attempting remedies to no avail. This evidence is
dearly relevant to the cases of persons similarly situated even though
they have not attempted remedies for lack of funds, out of fear, or
for any other reason. Others might have gathered evidence of legislation or administrative practices that obstructed their attempts at
remedies. The mere fact that all the individuals allege the same
substantive offense by the respondent state is relevant to the issue of
exhaustion based on the assumption that a government with a policy
15. The European Commission of Human Rights was established in 1953 under
article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights, along with the European Court
of Human Rights. See generally A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1963).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was established in 1960 by the Council of the Organization of American States. See generally Sandifer, Human Rights in
the Inter-American System, 11 How. L.J. 508 (1965).
16. See 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 20.
17. Individual cases are combined to form packages by the government espousing
the claims before presenting them to the international court or tribunal. E.g., FranceNorway Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. 1; Johnson Case (United States v. Peru)

(1870), in J. MOORE, A DIoST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1656-57 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE, DIGEST]. There have not been many package cases in

customary international law, largely because governments seldom have taken action
which causes widespread injury to aliens. Borchard, The Local Remedy Rule, 28 Am.
J. INT'L L. 729, 732 (1934). Where there are widespread injuries, the claims frequently
are settled by an ad hoc procedure established by treaty. See notes 69-79 infra.
18. The working group of the Subcommission might receive complete packages
prepared in advance or piece together separate communications into a consistent pattern of gross violations.
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to commit certain substantive violations will not provide remedies for
them. Nevertheless, the Subcommission feels it necessary to treat each
claim in the consistent pattern separately, without reference to the
evidence of the other individuals who fall within the consistent
pattern.19
This Comment takes the position that the exhaustion rule should
be applied by the Subcommission to the individual case in the context of other cases, rather than in isolation.2 0 There is nothing in the
overall mandate of the Subcommission to prevent this from being
done. On the contrary, from the fact that the Subcommission is designed to review individual complaints arises a strong inference that
the domestic remedies rule should be applied in a manner most favorable to the complainant. There are already specific aspects of Subcommission procedure that adequately protect national sovereignty,
thereby allowing, if not requiring, flexible interpretation of the exhaustion rule in order to protect individuals' interests.
The major obstacle to such an interpretation is a poorly articulated but frequently repeated generalization that international law
requires a very rigid application of the rule so as to maximize protection of national sovereignty. This Comment will show that a niche
has been carved out of customary international law providing for more
equitable treatment of individual claimants and more flexible application of the rule; and furthermore, that regional human rights bodies,
experimenting with different applications, have expanded that niche
to the point where the old generalization has little validity in the
modern setting.
I. THE TIMING OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
The initial question concerning the application of the domestic
remedies rule in the Subcommission is whether the individual communications are linked together in a consistent pattern before or after
the exhaustion requirement is considered. As explained above, if the
19. Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to the United Nations on Human Rights Violations, 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE L'HommE 375, 384 (1972).
20. This is a "class action" approach to satisfying the exhaustion requirement.
Assuming the cases within the consistent pattern are substantially similar, it follows
that evidence presented in one case should be applied to others.
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package is formed after the domestic remedies rule has been applied,
the individual complaints are disadvantaged by consideration in isolation; if the package is formed before the exhaustion requirement is
applied, each individual can enjoy the advantage of drawing on the
evidence of frustrated attempts at remedies offered by each of the
other individuals.
There is no express guidance on this question in the domestic
remedies provisions of the resolutions which set forth the Subcommission's procedure. However, it is clear from the early debates on the
function of the Subcommission that the drafters of the procedure were
concerned first about identification of consistent patterns of gross violations and secondly about exhaustion of remedies.
In 1967, the Economic and Social Council authorized the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission to consider "situations which reveal a consistent pattern of violations" and to examine
"information relevant to gross violations of human rights," but said
nothing about domestic remedies. 21 For several years thereafter, the
various organs of the United Nations debated what sources were to be
used in gathering information about violations of human rights. 22 The
questions of "consistent pattern" and "gross violations" were recurring issues and were always included in proposals for new procedure.
But it was not until 1971, when the function of the Subcommission
was defined and the sources of its information determined, that the
issue of domestic remedies arose.23
The initial paragraph of the 1970 Economic and Social Council
Resolution 1503 describes the competence of the Subcommission. It
authorizes the Subcommission to appoint a working group to review all
communications and refer to the full Subcommission those "which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross . . . violations of hu21. ECOSOC Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17-18 U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
22. 25 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report, 46 U.N. ECOSOC 135-48,
212-14, U.N. Doc. E/4621 (1969); 21 Subcommission, Summary Report, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.V976, at 24-34 (1968); 24 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report,
44 U.N. ECOSOC, at 58-79, U.N. Doc. E/4475 (1968); 20 Subcommission, Summary
Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/947, at 32-41 (1967).
23. After the Economic and Social Council adopted the general procedure for
the handling of individual communications in 1970, ECOSOC Res. 1503, supra note
2, the Subcommission began serious consideration of specific procedural requirements,
including the domestic remedies rule. 24 Subcomnission Report, supra note 1, at 7-33.
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man rights. ' 24 In the second paragraph, the Subcommission is instructed to "devise . .. appropriate procedures for dealing with the

questions of admissibility of communications.."25 The resolution seems
to acknowledge the traditional distinction between competence and
admissibility. In strict judicial proceedings, of course, the issue of
competence is considered prior to any determination on admissibility. 26
Additional support for the contention that the consistent pattern
is to be formed prior to consideration of the exhaustion requirement
can be found in the time limit placed on the meetings of the working
group. It is "to meet once a year

..

for a period not exceeding ten

days." 27

During that time, the working group is to consider "all communications, including replies of Governments thereon . ...,,28Given
the fact that each year there are approximately 14,000 communications sent to the Secretary General and transferred to the Subcommission, 29 the working group must find some shortcuts for carrying out
its task.30 It must either deal with all of the communications in a
given year or postpone consideration of many, in which case it will
get hopelessly behind and return to the old policy of filing them
away.31 The postponement shortcut would defeat the purpose behind
24. ECOSOC Res. 1503, para. 1, supra note 2, at 8.

25. Id.
26. An objection to jurisdiction relates to the competence of the tribunal, and if
it is not overcome then the case is terminated. An objection to admissibility, however,
is concerned with some condition to be fulfilled before the body will deal with the case.
If the admissibility requirement is not overcome, the tribunal usually maintains jurisdiction over the case until certain conditions are met. The issue of admissibility sometimes is considered at the same time as that of jurisdiction, but generally it "is dropped
at once until the question of jurisdiction is decided." C. LAw, supra note 6, at 44. See
also T. HAPSLER, supra note 6, at 150-51.
27. ECOSOC Res. 1503, para, 1, supra note 2, at 8. The 10-day limit originated
in the 1968 discussions in the Subcommission. 21 Subcommission, Summary Report,
U.N. Doc E/CN.4/976, at 34 (1968). The vote on the 10-day limit was 7-0-8.
28. ECOSOC Res. 1503, para. 1, supra note 2, at 8.
29. The Secretariat began receiving individual communications as soon as it was
established in 1945. Ever since 1947 the communications have been transferred to the
Commission on Human Rights and to the Subcommission. See note 31 infra.
30. A. Cassese has explained the importance of adding time-saving provisions in
the procedure of the Subcommission and working group. Cassese, supra note 19, at 376.
31. In 1947 the ECOSOC suggested that the Secretary General transfer individual
communications to the Commission on Human Rights, although it was recognized that the
Commission had "no power to take any' action." ECOSOC Res. 75, 5 U.N. ECOSOC
20, U.N. Doc. 5/573 (1947). In 1949 the Secretary General requested the Commission
to reconsider the position that it had "no power." Report by the Secretary General on
the Present Situation with Regard to Communications Concerning Human Rights, U.N.
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resolution 1503. An acceptable shortcut would be first to make the
relatively easy determination of the consistent pattern and then to
apply the difficult admissibility requirements only to those communications within the pattern.
Another indication that the exhaustion requirement should be
applied only after the forming of a consistent-pattern package is
found in the provision of the Subcommission's procedure dealing with
"sources of communications." Communications to the Subcommission
may originate from "any person or group of persons who have direct
and reliable knowledge" of consistent patterns of gross violations, 32
including nongovernmental organizations. 3 By virtue of this provision, the Subcommission now receives, 34 and will certainly continue
to receive, packages of petitions from groups of persons and nongovernmental organizations which attempt to meet the consistent
pattern of gross violations requirement.25 Having invited packaged
submissions, the Subcommission has availed itself of subject matter
in a form most easily handled by initial determination of the integrity
of the pattern, and subsequent consideration of the domestic remedies
rule.
If we accept the proposition that packages are to be formed in
the Subcommission prior to consideration of the domestic remedies
Doc. E/CN.4/165, at 4-8 (1949). The letters were acknowledged by the Secretary General, transferred to the Commission, and nothing more was done. This procedure continued until 1967 when the information was used by the Subeommission and Commission for studies on gross violations of human rights and racial discrimination. See
ECOSOC Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
32. Subcommission Res. 1, para. 2(a), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1,
at 50.
33. Id. Nongovernmental organizations (hereinafter referred to as NGO's) generally are private international organizations with special interests and expertise. Article
71 of the United Nations Charter authorizes the Economic and Social Council to "make
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with matters within its competence."
34. The working group brought a number of packages of petitions to the attention of the Subcommission in 1972 and 1973. Housa SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE COlM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9 3D CONO., 2D
SEss., HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 28 (1974). NGO's prepackaged
some of the submissions. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations
and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 16,
at 723-29 (1973).
35. The International Commission of Jurists has published a pamphlet counseling petitioners that "an isolated or single instance of a violation is not enough. The
alleged violation must have occurred often enough to form a consistent (sic) pattern
. . .2) INTERNATIONAL
RIGHTS 6 (1973).

COMMISSION OF JURISTS,

GROSS

VIOLATIONS

OF HUMAN
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rule, the issue is whether the packages should be broken down into
individual cases to be considered in terms of the exhaustion requirement in isolation, or should remain in the package to be treated in
context with the other cases in the pattern. Acceptance of the proposition that the working group is to create the package before considering admissibility requirements of individual communications would
strongly support the conclusion that the exhaustion requirement is to
be applied in the contextual manner. There is considerable precedent
for such application in customary international law and the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies.

II.

PRECEDENT FOR CONTEXTUAL

APPLICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

When a package claim appears in customary international law
cases, the domestic remedies rule is applied in a contextual manner.
In addition, when an isolated individual has not attempted domestic
remedies, he is allowed to establish the need for an exception by
evidence beyond his personal experience. In such instances, the rule is
also applied in a contextual manner. The regional human rights
bodies have continued the practice of contextual application and
have added some important refinements to it.
At the heart of the domestic remedies rule in customary international law is the presumption that a nation will provide effective
remedies for an injured alien 3 6 In the majority of cases, this presumption is valid; resort to domestic remedies usually results in relief.3 7 When the claimant is confronted by this presumption he has
two options. The first would be to produce evidence that all available
remedies have been attempted without satisfaction. This is a direct
attack on the presumption based on personal experience with the
domestic system of judicial and administrative remedies. When claim36. E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD OR THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 817 (1915); A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 74-83, 438-39;
T. HAESLER, supra note 6, at 55-60; C. LAw, supra note 6, at 16, 55.
37. F. DAwsON & I. HEAD, supra note 7, at 19. A second reason for the exhaustion requirement is efficiency of judicial administration. See text accompanying note 86
infra.
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ant proves that he has tested "the whole system" of domestic remedies"
to no avail, the matter becomes one of international concern; the
case is said to be internationalized by his having established "a deliberate state policy" to deny him justice. 39 If the evidence necessary
for successfully litigating a direct attack is not available, the claimant
can exercise his second option and make an indirect attack on the
the presumption by use of evidence beyond his personal experience.40
Seeking exception to the exhaustion requirement, he compensates
for his own failure to attempt remedies by providing evidence of the
futility of an attempt. 41 An exception will be granted when the
evidence indicates a governmental policy to deny justice in cases substantially similar to that of the claimant. This use of evidence beyond
38. The Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 120
(1965). The "whole system" includes procedural (administrative) and legal remedies,
but, as the Arbitrator added, it is clear "that it cannot be strained too far . . . ." Id.
See also T. HEsLER, supra note 6, at 28-29; Head, A Fresh Look at the Local Remedies Rule, 5 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 142, 152 (1967).
39. E. BoRCHARD, supra note 36, at 817-18. See C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILrrY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1928); A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at
77-83. Responsibility attaches when an alien has suffered injury as a result of the conduct of state agents which violates international law, but the case is receivable at the
international level only when attempts at domestic remedies are obviously futile. See
notes 147-49 infra & accompanying text.
40. The claimant had personal experience with the government as far as the
initial injury is concerned but not with the government's system of remedies.
41. The way has been cleared for the indirect attack by the victory of the procedural view of the domestic remedies rule over the substantive view. According to
the former, a substantive injury to the alien might be a breach of international law
even though it is not a violation of municipal law; proof of the injury is prima facie
,evidence of a government policy to add a procedural injury to the alien in the form
of a denial of justice, and exhaustion is not necessary. The view treats the domestic
remedies rule as a procedural step in international litigation that can be by-passed
when evidence related to the substantive offense indicates obvious futility. The substantive view of the rule is that no international responsibility attaches to the respondent government until there is a failure to provide an effective remedy for a
substantive injury. Thus, any case before an international body would involve two
injuries: the original (substantive) one and the denial of justice. The substantive view
creates the unusual situation in which a substantive injury is not a breach of domestic
law, nevertheless the injured alien must attempt domestic remedies. See T. HAESLER,
supra note 6, at 103; C. LAw, supra note 6, at 20-37; Fawcett, The Exhaustion o1
Local Remedies, 31 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 452 (1954).
One of the strongest arguments in support of the substantive view is the practice
in customary international law of regarding the nonexhaustion defense as an objection to admissibility rather than jurisdiction. As such, it is "a dilatory temporal objection." S. RosENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 517
(1965). Another argument is that the domestic remedies defense can be waived. C.
JENKS, supra note 12, at 534; C. LAw, supra note 6, at 147-48; deWilde, Ooms and
Versyp Cases, [1971], Publ's Eur. Ct. Human Rights, ser. A, 12, 17.
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the personal experience of the plaintiff is what is meant by "contextual" application of the rule.
There are four sources from which the petitioner can cull evidence for use in an indirect attack. All four are accepted to varying
extents in the jurisprudence of traditional international courts and
tribunals and the regional human rights bodies.
First, he might produce evidence of futile attempts made in domestic courts by individuals similarly situated-classic judicial precedent.42 As the Permanent Court of International Justice stated' in the

Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case: "[T]here can be no need to resort
to municipal courts . . .if the result must be repetition of a decision

already given." 43 The prior judicial decision cited by the claimant in
the Panevezys-Saldutiskis case was beyond his personal experience and
otherwise unrelated to his case. Just as easily, however, if the individual claimant had been part of a package complaint, he could have
produced evidence of futile attempts at remedies made by other
plaintiffs in the package. 44 The European Commission has followed
customary international law in reliance upon judicial precedent to
45
grant an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
42. There are three essential ingredients in the indirect attack based on judicial
sources: 1) an independent judicial system in the respondent government; 2) application of stare decisis by the domestic judicial system; 3) imputability of the particular
decision to the highest level of the judiciary. Where these ingredients exist, international courts and tribunals are comfortable inferring the futility of attempting remedies. See J. DEBEus, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GENERAL CLAIMIS COMMISSION, U.S.
& MEmco 130 (1938); A FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 415-16; C. JENKS, supra note 12,
at 591.
43. Estonia-Lithuania Panevezys-Saldutiskis Ry. Case, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B.
No. 76, at 18. The applicant state introduced a similar case decided by the highest
court of the respondent state as evidence of the futility of attemping the same remedy.
The international court accepted the argument, but found that the prior judgment was
not determinative and that the judicial remedy had to be exhausted. Id. at 21-22.
44. E.g., Johnson Case (United States v. Peru) (1870), in MOORE, DIGEST
1656-57. This was a package claim in which two of several victims of civil outbreaks
had sought compensation for damages in Peruvian provincial courts. In view of the
fact that the petitions of the two were denied by domestic courts, the international
tribunal held it to be immaterial that the other victims of the same outbreak had not
attempted remedies.
45. E.g., deWilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases, [1971], Publs Eur. Ct. Human Rights,
A, 12, 17; X v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 144; X v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 344; see Daneius, Conditions of Admissibility in the Jurisprudence of
the European Commission of Human Rights, 2 REVUE DES DROITS DE .'HomME 284,
296-98 (1969).
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Second, the petitioner may make an indirect attack on the presumption by reference to legislation. 46 A. V. Freeman has described
the rationale behind acceptance of this kind of indirect attack: "[R]esort to the national tribunals is excused when there is no possibility
of obtaining justice due to national legislation under which the local
courts could do nothing else than to pronounce judgment denying to
a claimant the relief prayed for." 47 The jurisprudence of traditional
international tribunals indicates that one application of one statute is
sufficient evidence to establish that the legislation is operative and
imputable to the highest authority,4 and to allow the conclusion of
futility. For example, in the Cotesworth and Powell case, 40 the Colombian government used legislation to block a British national,from
pursuing a cause of action against a local judge who injured the
foreigner in a bankruptcy proceeding. The single statute granted the
judge immunity from legal action of any kind. The international arbitration commission regarded evidence of the legislation as proof of
futility and an exception to the exhaustion requirement was made.
Claimants before the regional human rights bodies have presented
similar evidence and exceptions have been granted. 0
46. See generally E. BORCHARD, supra note 36, at 181-83; J. DEB uS, supra note

42, at 137-38; C. EAGLETON, supra note 39, at 63-67. If there is a constitutional government and judicial review of legislation, theoretically at least, a statute that appears on
its face to deprive the claimant of a remedy cannot be used at the international level
until the domestic courts have ruled on it. In most countries, however, laws are not
subject to judicial review. C. LAw, supra note 6, at 69-70. Where there is judicial review, the laws are not subject to wide interpretation. C. JENKS, supra note 12, at 591.
The result is that many international courts and tribunals in customary international
law have not relied on domestic court interpretations, but treated municipal law "as a
matter of fact." C. JENKS, supra at 548-53; C. LAw, supra at 66; see H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT

101 (1958). Therefore, even the existence of judicial review does not necessarily preclude the claimant at the international level from using legislative evidence of futility.
47. A. FREEMAN, Supra note 6, at 421.

48. See A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 108-09; Borchard, supra note 17, at 732.
49. Cotesworth & Powell Case (Great Britain v. Colombia) (1875) in MooRE,
DIGEST 2050.
50. In deBecker v. Belgium, [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIoHTS 214,
a Belgian applicant before the European Commission was granted an exception to the
exhaustion requirement after the Commission reviewed a national law that limited the
competence of the nation's highest civil court in such a way as to deny the applicant
review of an adverse finding by a military court. In Hansen v. Brazil, Case 1683,
OEA/Ser/L/V/II.28, at 8 (Inter-Am. Comm'n 1972), the relatives of the decedent
were unable to appeal a decision on a wrongful death action against the government
because of national legislation.
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The third recognized means for mounting an indirect attack
employs evidence of administrative acts. The major issue in the use
of this source is whether or not the acts can be imputed to the highest
level of government and thereby reflect "a deliberate state policy."' at
In order to insure imputability, the practice has been that a case is
not internationalized by a single act but by a "sum of all acts" on the
theory that only after the series of acts does the "whole treatment of
the individual [by the government] become .

.

. visible."' 2

The best example of this approach to the exhaustion requirement
in customary international law appears in the Montano case,53 in
which a Peruvian national received a judgment in an American
(federal) court but was left unsatisfied due to misconduct of a marshal charged with executing the writ. He could have brought an action against the marshal for damages but turned to his own government to take his claim to an international tribunal. The Peruvian
Government first sought a settlement with the United States Government, which refused to take action against the marshal, 54 and then
took the case to an international umpire, who noted the acts by the
United States Government and its agents and concluded that no further attempts at domestic relief were necessary. Apparently, the um51. See note 39 supra. For a discussion of international responsibility for administrative acts and omissions, see A. FREEMiAN, supra note 6, at 22-26, 109-14; Meron,
International Responsibility of States for Unauthorized Acts of Their Officials, 34 BR.

Y.B.

INT'L L. 90 (1957).
52. T. HAESLER, supra note 6, at 104. A. V. Freeman agreed with this idea and
counseled against imposition of international responsibility for any one act. A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 114. This proof requirement contrasts with that applied where
the attack is by evidence of legislation. See text accompanying note 47 supra. See also
France-Norway Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. 39 (Lauterpacht, J., concurring).
Judge Lauterpacht referred to legislation which on its face deprives the claimants of
a remedy, but made no reference to administrative acts which would establish prima
facie evidence for an exception. See T. HAEsLER, supra note 6, at 59 (discussing this
omission by Judge Lauterpacht). The respondent government in 57 Inhabitants of Louvain & Environs v. Belgium, [1964] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMiAN RIGHTS 260, indicated a similar distinction when it waived the non-exhaustion defense because the applicants attacked legislation and ministerial acts. Where the executive controls the administration of the courts and establishes laws that are nonreviewable, it is difficult to
place the source of evidence in any particular category. E.g., Johnson Case (United States

v. Peru) (1870), in MOORE, DIGEST 1656-57.

53. Montano Case (Peru v. United States) (1863), in MOORE, DIGEST 1630.
54. It appears the marshal denied the writ because of congressional legislation preventing payment for damages to aliens in gold. Regardless, before taking the case to
the international level, there was evidence of one act by the marshal and two acts by
the United States Attorney General in refusing to intercede, first, against the state
where the execution was to be made and, second, against the marshal.
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pire believed that the series of acts revealed a deliberate state policy
to deny the claimant an effective remedy. 5
The "series of acts" in this case derived from the facts of the
case itself. Just as easily, however, they might have come from other
cases in a package, as indicated by the jurisprudence of the regional
human rights bodies.
For example, in the Second Cyprus case55 before the European
Commission, the applicant state, Greece, described administrative
acts of minor officials affecting 29 specific individuals, all of whom
were unable to produce the names of their torturers and, therefore,
unable to bring a domestic action against their government, the
United Kingdom.5 7 Of the 29, at least nine sought the names of the
authors of the alleged acts and were denied access to the information
by prison officials. The remainder, however, either made an unsuccessful request for an investigation without the necessary names or
failed to make any effort at all; nevertheless, they were granted an
exception to the domestic remedies rule along with the nine assertive
individuals, based on the rationale that an attempt "would . .. not
have produced any more positive result."58 The pattern of the nine
refusals allowed the inference that there was a deliberate state policy
to prevent those who did not know the names of their torturers from
ever obtaining such information, thereby blocking them from domestic relief. 9
55. Compare Diaz v. Guatemala (Central Am. Ct. Justice 1909) reproduced in 3
AM. J. INT'L L. 737 (1909), where the claimant sought damages, inter alia, for harsh
treatment in prison and offered some evidence of administrative acts denying access to
remedies while incarcerated. In finding the evidence insufficient to grant an exception
to the exhaustion requirement, the court appeared in part to be indicating the need for
substantial evidence where this source is used for the indirect attack and in part to be
reacting to the general allegations of despotism that accompanied the specific charges
of denial of access to remedies.
56. Greece v. the United Kingdom, [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 186 (also cited as Second Cyprus Case).
57. British authorities governing Cyprus at that time allowed civil and criminal
actions to be brought against named officials only.
58. Greece v. the United Kingdom, [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HusA1
RIGHTS 186.
59. The Commission regarded it "superfluous to distinguish among the three categories of cases in respect of the application of Article 26 . . . [because] the Greek Government has established that the British Authorities displayed no readiness to indicate
the names of the perpetrators of the alleged torture or ill-treatment." Id. at 194. Although the Commission was willing to conclude from nine concrete cases of obstruction that it was futile for those without names to attempt to obtain them, it was un-
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The fourth source of evidence for the indirect attack is of particular importance to a discussion of the Subcommission because it
minimizes the burden on the individual petitioner to prove the futility of attempting domestic remedies. Evidence of open interference
with domestic remedies through legislation or administrative acts is
not necessary. Rather, evidence of the legislative measure or administrative act causing the initial offense (the substantive offense), b
itself, is sufficient on the theory that governments which allow confiscation or torture, for example, will not provide remedies for these
acts. 60
Because substantive offenses are caused either by laws or executive acts, the proof required to establish futility follows the same
pattern as discussed above, 61 where the legislative and administrative
sources were used to establish open interference with the domestic
system of remedies. In the Norwegian Loans case, 62 for example,
evidence of one statute applied to an uncertain number of claimants
was sufficient to establish that the legislation was operative and imputable to the highest authority. 63 Although the exhaustion issue was
never reached, one judge indicated that the Norwegian legislation
which injured the French nationals was prima facie evidence of the
willing to conclude that it was futile for those with names to obtain effective relief. The
Commission felt there was insufficient evidence that "the bringing of an action by a person in custody against an official would be fraught with special risks .

. . ."

Id. This

reflects a strong presumption in favor of the British authorities and a certain amount of
timidity on the part of the newly-formed Commission. Ten years later, in the First
Greek Case, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands v. Greece, E1968] Y.B. EuR.
CoN . oN HUiAN RrGHTS 690 (also cited as First Greek Case), the Commission was
presented more specific evidence of administrative interference with the judicial system
(a three-day suspension of the judges' tenure, removal of 29 judicial officials, and
indefinite suspension of certain constitutional guarantees related to trials) and held
that it was futile for alleged victims of torture to attempt remedies.
60. A. V. Freeman explained the theory behind this attack: "One might . . .
legitimately wonder whether, when the injury is one inflicted under orders of the highest authorities of Government-such as confiscation-there is any reason for the local
sovereign to be-'given an opportunity for examining the facts and law giving rise to
the claim." A. FRaEmAN, supra note 6, at 433-34. The "orders of the highest authorities" can be in the form of either legislation or executive acts. See Borchard, supra
note 17, at 732; Lillich, The Effectiveness of the Local Remedies Rule Today, 1964
Am. Soc.

INT'L

L. PRoa'Gs 101.

61. See text accompanying notes 46-59 infra.
62. France-Norway Norwegian Loans Case [1957] I.C.J. 1.
63. The statute dealt with the convertibility of municipal bonds into gold by
foreign nationals, a matter most likely to be the sole concern of the national government. This facilitated proof of imputability.
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futility of attempting remedies, 64 and another judge wrote that the
rule should not be applied "[w]here the rights of the applicant national [had] been impaired by direct intervention of the respondent
65
government or Parliament."
Whereas evidence of one application of a statute causing a substantive injury might suffice to establish futility, one act causing a
substantive injury generally does not. For example, in the La A bra
Silver Mining Company case,6 6 there was evidence of an act of confiscation of a mine and seizure of ore, but the umpire also referred
to separate acts of hostility by the government toward the company's agent and acts by the government encouraging the national to
behave in a similarly hostile manner.67 This case involved evidence
derived from the isolated claimant. It might just as easily have been
contained in a pattern of cases comprising a package petition.
In customary international law package petitions frequently are
handled by means of treaty and special ad hoc procedures, especially
where there is an administrative act causing widespread injuries.6 8
The ad hoc procedures generally omit the domestic remedies rule 9
on the premise that the pattern of offenses indicates that the respon0
dent nation is incapable of rendering justice
64. France-Norway Norwegian Loans Case [1957] I.C.J. 1, 39 (Lauterpacht, J.,
concurring).

65. Id. at 97 (Read, J., concurring).
66. La Abra Silver Mining Co. Case (United States v. Mexico) (1875) in 2
Moo,_, DiGST 1327.

67. The umpire "thought the evidence showed that the local authorities were determined to drive the claimants out of the country. So determined was this hostility
that it would have been useless to appeal to the courts of justice." Id. at 1328.
68. There has been a steady growth in lump sum settlement of packages of claims
in the past thirty years. F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 7, at 292; Lillich, supra
note 60, at 102.
69. E.g., United States-Mexico Claims Convention, Sept. 8, 1923, Pan Am. T.S.

678 (art. 5); United States-Panama Convention, July 28, 1926, Pan Am. T.S. 842
(art. 5).
70. There appear to be two reasons for omitting the exhaustion reqftirement in such
circumstances. First, there is the feeling that a government causing widespread substantive injuries is incapable of offering effective remedies. See, e.g., A. FREEMAN,
supra note 6, at 439-40. Second, in a bilateral treaty situation there is a desire to avoid

the irritation caused by allegations that accompany the local remedies rule. As one

jurist explains, where conciliation is the object of the procedure, the settlement is extrajudicial and there is no need for judicial admissibility requirements such as the do-

mestic remedies rule. Switzerland-United States Interhandel Case [1959] I.C.J. 27, 45
(Cordova, J., concurring); see Borchard, supra note 17, at 732. The domestic reme-

dies rule is also frequently waived in agreements to arbitrate. C. LAw, supra note 6,
at 93-98.
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The indirect attack based on substantive sources has also appeared
in the jurisprudence of the regional human rights bodies. For example, in the First Greek case, 71 the European Commission considered the claim that a pattern of acts of torture established a deliberate state policy-an "administrative practice"-and permitted the
inference that attempts at domestic remedies would be futile. The
Commission accepted the idea of attacking the presumption with
evidence of substantive offenses, but did not feel the four applicant
states had established an "administrative practice." 72 The Commission indicated that such a practice must include two elements-repetition of acts and official tolerance 7 3-but was silent as to which element
was missing. 74
The Second Greek case 75 added 12 new allegations of torture to
71. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands v. Greece, [1968] Y.B. EUR. CONy.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 690 [hereinafter referred to as First Greek Case].

72. Id. at 770.
73. In its decision on the merits, the Commission defined "repetition of acts"
as a substantial number of acts which are the expression of a general situation (that is,
a pattern). The pattern may be either: a) in the same place, that is, agents of the
same police or military authority, or victims of the same political category; or b) in
several places at the hands of distinct authorities or inflicted on persons of varying
political affiliations. First Greek Case, [1969] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
195. "Official tolerance" was said to exist where superiors of those immediately responsible, though cognizant of such acts, take no action; or where higher authorities,
in the face of numerous allegations, manifest indifference by refusing any adequate investigation; or where in a judicial proceeding a fair hearing is denied. Id. at 196.
In the decision on admissibility, the Commission indicated that official tolerance need
not be based on specific legislation, executive authority express or implied or on custom.
First Greek Case, [1968] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUiMAN RIGHTS 690, 700.

74. The Commission never stated the number of victims of torture contained in the
application, but a fair estimate would be 50-60 based on the number of witnesses called
by the subcommission that eventually investigated the case, and on the assumption that
most witnesses were victims. See [1969] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5-11. The
number of repetitive acts would seem to have been sufficient. The same would appear
correct with regard to agency distribution; almost all civilian and military intelligence
and police forces seem to have been involved. Id. at 186, 650. The weak link must
have been in the proof of official tolerance. There was no direct evidence of a denial
of a remedy to the victims, but there was evidence of a general denial of effective
remedies, which allowed the inference of official tolerance. [1968] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON
HuMAN RIGHTS 69. The numerical repetition and agency distribution should also have
supported that inference, although allowing the use of that evidence for proof of tolerance would undermine the distinction between repetition and tolerance. Perhaps the
best explanation for the refusal to grant an exception is the inherent reluctance of
traditionally minded international bodies to admit a case based on prima facie circumstantial evidence. See text accompanying notes 89-90, 150-153 infra.
75. Denmark, Norway, Sweden v. Greece, 34 COLL. OF DECISIONS OF THE EUR.
CO M'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS 64 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Second Greek Case].
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the pattern established in the First Greek case,7 and held that the
new victims need not exhaust domestic remedies.77 The European
Commission confirmed its acceptance of this method of indirect at78
tack in two subsequent cases.
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights also has accepted patterns of administrative acts causing substantive injuries as
evidence of the futility of attempting domestic remedies. The Statute
of the Commission, adopted in 1960, allows the Commission "to review conditions in individual countries where flagrant and persistent
violations of human rights obtain, and to make findings or recommendations concerning them." 79 There was no provision for exhaustion of domestic remedies in the Statute. In 1965, the Resolution of
the Second Special Inter-American Conference expanded the powers
of the Commission to include consideration of a new type of casethe "individual case"-for which there was an exhaustion requirement. 0 The cases involving "flagrant and persistent violations of human rights" have since been distinguished as "general cases." 81
Recently, the Commission considered a case brought against Bra76. Prior to the Second Greek Case, the allegations contained in the First Greek
Case, were investigated by a special subcommission, after which the Commission found
that the information gathered established that "there has since April 1967 been a
practice of torture and ill-treatment . . . of persons arrested for political reasons."
[1969] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RZIGHTS 1, 504. Therefore, the twelve new allegations had a firm foundation of substantiated evidence.
77. It is very unlikely that the 12 cases alone would have been sufficient to establish an administrative practice. Rather, the Commission indicated that the practice actually existed prior to the Second Greek Case and the 12 new allegations were
simply "further proof." 34 COLL. OF DECISIONS EUR. COA',N HUMAN RIGHiTS at 74.
78. Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 41 COLL. OF DEcISIoNs EUR. COMM'N HUMAN
RIGHTS 3, 85-87 (1972) (article 3 violations); Donnelly v. the United Kingdom, 43
COLL. OF DECISIONS EUR. COMM'N HUMAN RIGHTS 122, 144-49 (1973). For a discussion of these two cases, see Boyle & Hannum, Individual Applications Under the Euro-

pean Convention of Human Rights and the Concept of Administrative Practice: The
Donnelly Case, 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 440 (1974).
79. This is the broad assertion of competence that emerged from the jurisprudence
of the Commission in its early years of receiving individual petitions. Sandifer, supra
note 15, at 517-18.
80. X, Y, Z v. Brazil, Case No. 1684, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at 13, 18 (Inter-Am.
Comm'n 1972).
81. "General" cases were brought in the early 1960s against Cuba, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic. They all involved allegations of violations on a massive scale.
Sandifer, supra note 15, at 519; see Schreiber, Human Rights in Revolutionary Cuba,
2 RmvuE DES DRorrs DE L'HoMME 139 (1969); Report Sur La Situation des Droits de
l'Homme en Haiti, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OASOR, OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.8, Doe. 5 (1963).
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in which evidence of a pattern of tortures 3 was sufficient to

allow treatment as a "general case," and an exception to the exhaustion requirement was granted. 4 Essentially, the steps taken here
were the same as those taken in the European Commission proceedings: after finding a government policy to torture, an inference was
drawn that there were no effective remedies.
In summary, contextual application of the domestic remedies rule
has been utilized in the jurisprudence of the traditional courts and tribunals and in the human rights bodies where an isolated individual has
made an indirect attack on the presumption that effective remedies
exist. In these attacks, the individual offers evidence beyond his personal experience; he compensates for not attempting remedies with
proof that any attempt would have been futile. Packages of claims
bring together evidence for the indirect attack gathered by a number
of plaintiffs that otherwise would be produced by the isolated individual alone. Packages are not essential for the indirect attack, but
they greatly assist any individual who needs evidence beyond his personal experience. The packages are particularly helpful where administrative sources are used in the indirect attack because of the
need to establish a pattern of acts. When there is a package claim the
82. X, Y, Z v. Brazil, Case 1684, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at 13 (Inter-Am. Comm'n
1972).
83. The exact number of cases in the package petition was unclear. There most
likely were at least 1,000 individual complaints, because Amnesty International which
took part in preparing the petition had documentary evidence of the torture of over
1,000 Brazilians and identified 472 individual perpetrators. Sklar, Infringement of
Human Rights in Brazil and the United States and O.A.S. Response, in Hearings,

supra note 34, at 897, 905.
84. X, Y, Z v. Brazil Case 1684, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at 20. One member (Dr.
Abranches) argued against the "general" case classification; he contended it should be
regarded as "a combination of various 'individual cases' and that, consequently, the requirement . . . for the exhaustion of internal legal remedies [should be] . . . applied."
Id. This is the same argument used against contextual application of the domestic remedies rule in the Subcommission. See note 19 supra & accompanying text. Another member of the Commission (Dr. Fraga) distinguished this case from the prior "general
cases" where "human rights had been violated on a massive scale." X, Y, Z v. Brazil,
supra at 17. The majority view, however, seems to have been expressed by another
member, Dr. Ar~chaga, who refuted the position of Dr. Abranches by "pointing out that
if individuals were mentioned in the allegations df the case, such mention had been
made by the claimants by way of example in order to establish how general violations
of human rights could focus on individuals." Id. at 19. This position is very similiar to
that taken by the European Commission when it allowed individual applicants to raise
the issue of administrative practice as an argument for an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. Donnelly v. the United Kingdom, 43 COLL. OF DcisIoNs EUR. COMM'N
HUMAN RIGHTS 122, 146 (1973).
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domestic remedies rule, if applied at all, is given a contextual application in accordance with the principles established in cases involving
indirect attacks made by isolated individuals.
When the working group of the Subcommission has a pattern of
human rights violations in hand, it should treat the communications as a package. The pattern contains a wealth of evidence seldom
assembled in any traditional international law case. For those individuals in the pattern who have not attempted domestic remedies,
application of the exhaustion requirement in the context of the pattern will increase the likelihood of finding sufficient evidence-one
judicial precedent, one statute, or even a series of administrative acts
-to indicate the necessity of granting an exception to the rule. If
the Subcommission and its working group insist on handling each individual's complaint separately, they should at least regard the evidence contained in the other complaints in the pattern-that is, all
evidence beyond the personal experience of the individual-as evidence produced by that individual, and thereby offer him the benefit of contextual application.
The only remaining hurdle to be negotiated in handling the exhaustion rule is the proof requirement. If a restrictively high requirement is imposed on the indirect attack, especially with regard to the
vulnerable administrative and substantive sources, the assistance provided the individual claimant by "contextual application" will be
rendered meaningless.

III.

PROOF REQUIREMENTS

Analysis of the requirement of proof to be applied brings together three considerations: the fact-finding role of the international
body, the standard of proof, and the quantity of proof necessary to
meet the standard. These aspects of the proof problem are interrelated and each is directly influenced by the balance of interests-between the national sovereign and individual claimants-favored by
the tribunal before which the grievance is brought. That is to say,
if protection of national sovereigns is stressed, the international court
or tribunal might be passive in its fact finding, apply a high standard
of proof, and demand a large quantity of evidence before granting
an ekception to the domestic remedies rule. On the other hand, if
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the interests of the individual are favored, the international organ
might gather evidence on its own to supplement that of the petitioner,
apply a low standard of proof, and require only a small quantity of
evidence.
The balance of interests in the Subcommission is highly favorable to the individual. In general terms, this means the proof requirement should present no serious obstacles to the indirect attack. In
more specific terms, the fact-finding role assumed by the Subcommission, the standard of proof set, and the quantity of proof demanded
should all benefit the aggrieved petitioners.
A. The Balance of Interests
In the majority of cases before adjudicatory bodies of customary
international law, the balance of interests decidedly has favored the
national sovereign, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the
domestic remedies rule originated primarily for the protection of
national sovereignty.8, A secondary reason for the rule was administrative efficiency; it was considered necessary to force petitioners to
attempt domestic remedies "where justice, if available, is bound to
be more swift and less costly."8 6 Thus, it is not unusual to see international courts and tribunals requiring that all administrative as well
as judicial remedies be exhausted, 87 and that domestic legal remedies
be pursued as long as there is some chance of redress, even if it involves recourse to the same court three times. 8 Such holdings, however, place the presumption concerning effective domestic remedies
at an insurmountably high level.
Unfortunately, present-day legal scholars often generalize about
the domestic remedies rule based on its application in the majority
85. I. L. Head wrote that the avowed purpose of the domestic remedies rule is
"to permit a state to have the full opportunity to do justice to a claimant before it
is called upon internationally to answer to another state." HEAD, supra note 38, at
151; See E. BORCHARD, supra note 36, at 817; F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 7,
at 51-56; C. EAGLETON, supra note 39, at 100-02; T. HAESLER, supra note 6, at 25;
C. LAW, supra note 6, at 15-19.
86. HEAD, supra note 38, at 151. Mr. Head also emphasized that national law is
"the repository of the remedy" and that it is in the domestic legal system "that proper
investigation and prescriptive machinery is found." Id.

at 152; see 2 D.

O'CONNELL,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1024 (1965).
87. The Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. the United Kingdom), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A.
83, 120 (1956).
88. Switzerland-United States Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6.
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of cases before the adjudicatory bodies of customary international
law. 3 In doing so, they overlook a minority of cases in which the
factual situations are more analogous to those found in human rights
proceedings-cases in which equity has required a different, more
flexible application of the rule.9 0
The basis for the generalization frequently is the jurisprudence
of the most formal of the international adjudicatory bodies-the
courts. However, examination of the holdings of the courts indicates
that the domestic remedies rule seldom has been given careful scrutiny. Generally, it has not been an issue and when it has been the
courts have often joined that issue with consideration of the merits. 91
Judge Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice had to resort to dicta in the Norwegian Loans case92 in order to insert a meaningful discussion of the rule. His conclusion was that proper application of the rule required a balancing of the interests of the responbe
dent national sovereign and the applicant, and that this could
93
litigants.
the
between
proof
of
burden
the
done by distributing
The best description of the proper balance has been offered by
89. See note 85 supra.
90. See note 12 supra.
91.

See C. JENKS, supra note 12, at 527-34.

92. France-Norway Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] I.C.J. 1.
93. Judge Lauterpacht wrote:
[S]ome prima facie distribution of the burden of proof there must be. This
being so, the following seems to be the accurate principle on the subject: (1)
as a rule, it is for the plaintiff state to prove that there are no effective remedies to which recourse can be had; (2) no such proof is required if there exists
legislation which on the face of it deprives the private claimants of a remedy; (3) in that case it is for the defendant state to show that, notwithstanding the apparent absence of a remedy, its existence can nevertheless be assumed; (4) the degree of burden of proof thus to be adduced ought not be
so stringent as to render the proof unduly exacting.
Id. at 39. A. V. Freeman interpreted the decision written by Judge Bagge to mean
that where there is a denial of justice the burden is distributed, but where there is a
substantive breach of international law, the burden is on the plaintiff. A. FREEMAfN,
supra note 6, at 432-33. T. Haesler claimed Judge Lauterpacht wrote about the distribution of the burden of proof out of concern that the general bias toward the defendant state interferes with the right of states to protect their nationals who have
claims against foreign governments. T. HAESLER, supra note 6, at 56. Haesler also
rationalized the historical presumption favoring the respondent state with the distributive burden by arguing that the presumption may help the respondent with regard to
the existence of domestic remedies, but not concerning the effectiveness of those remedies. Id. at 60. Where the burden of proof is distributed, the respondent, in addition to
raising the nonexhaustion defense, must present some evidence that remedies exist.
Neither party assumes a risk of nonpersuasion. For a discussion of the place in customary international law of the distribution of the burden of proof see, D. SANDIFER,
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 92-97 (1939).
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C. Wilfred Jenks: "The conflicting considerations of policy involved
resolve themselves into weighing the advantages of unburdening international relations of matters which should and can be settled nationally against the danger that, in the circumstances of the case,
insistence on further *recourse to local remedies will confirm or inflict
injustice or unreasonably delay the possibility of securing justice." 94
The proper balance has been struck in a number of cases in customary
international law where tribunals have responded to unusual factual
situations, such as the absence of a judicial system at a particular moment in the respondent state. 5 The tribunals in these cases were
forced to confront the presumption about effective remedies, to recognize the interests of the individual plaintiffs, and to respond by relaxing application of the exhaustion rule. It is this minority of cases in
customary international law that is of significance in the human
rights setting.
Human rights bodies have been created to protect the interests
of aggrieved persons. This fact alone should be adequate reason to
take special notice of the minority jurisprudence in customary international law in drafting procedures for international human rights
bodies.90 There is no legitimizing blind protection of national sov97
ereignty in the human rights context.
94. 0. JFNKS, supra note 12, at 537. International public policy is a relatively
new feature of international law. With the growth of international institutions, the
sense of an international community has become more clearly defined and international public policy has emerged. It follows from this that the developments of the last
thirty years regarding protection of human rights translate into increased concern for the

individual claimant and increased balance between the litigants.
95. E.g., Johnson Case (United States v. Peru) (1870), in MooRE, DIGEST 1656-57
(civil outbreak); R. E. Brown Case, (United States v. the United Kingdom), 6
U.N.R.I.A.A. 120 (1923) (civil disorder prior to annexation).
96. Recall the characteristics of the aggrieved person before the human rights
body which distinguish him from the claimant generally found in customary international
law. See notes 7-10 supra & accompanying text. Fundamental rights are at stake rather
than money; the claim is against his own government rather than an alien government;
he is poor and uneducated. One commentator has suggested eliminating the exhaustion requirement entirely in this context. P. DROST, supra note 14, at 118-19.
97. National sovereignty no longer means "unlimited unilateral assertion of as
much national power as a country can get away with." Larson, International Order and
National Sovereignty, 21 OATH. L. RaV. 80, 80-81 (1971); see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TRaSEAs 636-42 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). While the
system contains greater balance today than ever before, important obstacles to fur-

ther equity remain. See Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by United Nations
and Regional Organizations, 21 Da, PAUL L. REy. 307 (1971); Newman, Ombudsmen
and Human Rights, 34 U. CHI. L. RBV. 951 (1967); Sohn, Book Review, 62 Am. J.
INT'L L. 993 (1968).
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The drafters of the procedure for the two regional human rights
bodies have pursued a policy of balanced protection, although in
radically different manners. The sanction against the breaching government in the European system is very strong. 8 As a result, the
procedural demands on the individual are high, 0 although not prohibitive. 100 In the Inter-American system, the sanction is weak; 1 1 cor10 2
respondingly, the demands on the individual are extremely low.
98. The European Commission may refer individual petitions to the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, or take the case to the European Court of Human
Rights, both of which can render decisions that are legally binding. European Convention arts. 32, 48, 53, supra note 8.
99. Individual petitions are rejected if they are "anonymous," or if they are "incompatible with the provisions of the . . . Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an
abuse of the right of petition." Id. art. 27(1) (a), (2). Also, the petitioner must be a
"victim." Id. art. 25(1). There are indications this requirement may include "indirect"
or "future victims." J. FAwcETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 283-85 (1969). The petitioner must submit an application within
six months from the date on which the final domestic decision was taken. European
Convention art. 26 supra. Also, the generalization about the domestic remedies rule is
given life in the Convention in that article 26 provides for application of the rule "according to the generally recognized rules of international law." Id; see R. BEDDARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE

60-61 (1973); ef. Schaffer & Weissbrodt, supra note 14.

100. The Convention protects human rights covering the entire spectrum and
not just the most fundamental. European Convention arts. 2-18, supra note 8. Also,
there is express reference in the domestic remedies provision to the exception based
on either ineffective remedies or unreasonable delay of remedies. Id. art. 26.
101. Under the procedure for reviewing communications relating to "general
cases," if a violation is proven, the Commission may make recommendations to the
respondent. Statute, art. 9(bis), supra note 8; Regulations, art. 56, supra note 8, at 10.
According to this procedure, however, the Cormmission makes no decision, but may
only "take cognizance" of the communications or claims. Regulations, art. 37, at 6.
The procedure concerning "individual cases," on the other hand, calls for a decision
on the allegations made and recommendations to the government concerned. Id. art. 56,
at 10. If the measures recommended are not adopted, the Commission may refer the
matter to the consultative bodies of the Organization of American States in its annual
report. Id. art. 57(1); Statute art. 9(bis) (c). If no action is taken there, the Commission is allowed to publish the report. Regulations art. 57(2). The report conceivably could lead to collective action by the members of the regional organization. But
see A. SCHREIBER, THE INTER-AMERICAN ComlmISSIoN ON HUMAN RIOHTS 53-55
(1970).
102. In the procedure for "individual cases," the Commission will only examine
communications related to the most fundamental human rights. Statute art. 9 (bis) (a),
supra note 8; Regulations art. 53(a), supra note 8, at 8-10. No such limitation applies
to the procedure for "general cases." As in the European Commission (see note 98
supra), the Inter-American Commission rejects communications that are anonymous,
abusive, manifestly ill-founded and incompatible, whether the case is "general" or "individual." Regulations art. 39, at 6. However, the petitioner need not be a "victim."
Id. arts. 37, 53(a), at 6, 8-10. The domestic remedies rule applies only in "individual
cases." Statute art. 9(bis)(d); Regulations art. 54, at 10. This limitation does not
exist in the European Convention. The particulars of the domestic remedies provision for the "individual cases" is very similar to that in the European Convention; there
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Both systems allow the individual to be assisted by a nongovern03
mental organization or association.
The treatment of human rights in the United Nations is more
akin to the Inter-American than to the European system. The emphasis is on fact-finding and recommendations rather than binding
decisions. 0 4 The sanctions available to the most powerful United Nations organs are not coercive. 0 5 By the time the lower echelons of
the organization are reached, such as the Subcommission, any coercive
power that existed at the top has been reduced still further. 0 6
The main "sanction" is publicity, °7 but the strength of its effect is diminished by the fact that all actions taken by the Subcommission and the Commission on Human Rights must "remain confidential until such time as the Commission may decide to make
recommendations to the Economic and Social Council.' ' 0 8 Nothing
resembling a decision in the judicial sense appears in the procedure
until tl~e matter reaches the Commission.0 9 Even then, some memis a six-month requirement, Regulations art. 55, and express reference to the possibility of the exception, id. art. 54, but there is no mention of customary international law,

an omission which makes it easier to lay the generalization to rest.
103. European Convention art. 25, supra note 8; Regulations art. 53(a), supra
note 8, at 8-10. The European Convention also allows submissions on behalf of individuals by member states. European Convention art. 24.
104. Compare Statute art. 9, supra note 8 ("promoting respect for human rights")
with European Convention Preamble, supra note 8 ("first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration") and U.N.
CHARTER art. 1 ("promoting and encouraging respect for human rights"). Compare
note 100 supra with note 97 supra and note 113 infra.
105. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter concerning "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" empowers the Security Council to "make recommendations or decide what measures shall
be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER
art. 39. Several times the Security Council has found a human rights issue a threat
to international peace, but only in the case of Southern Rhodesia has it taken obligatory action; there it was decided to apply measures designed to stifle trade, dearly a
"lesser form of coercion." J. CARRY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
23 (1970).
106. The steps down include: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Subcommission.
107. See 24 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 58, 70, 73.
108. ECOSOC Res. 1503 para. 8, supra note 2. Recommendations are made only
after a thorough study by the Commission, or by an ad hoc committee. Id. para.
6(a)-(b).
109. The decision facing the Commission on Human Rights after study or investigation is whether to make recommendations to the Economic and Social Council.
Id. para. 8. Recommendations are based on certain "conclusions." See 24 Commission
on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 73.
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bers of the Commission have argued, "it might not be appropriate
for the Commission, which [is] not a judicial body, to express condemnations."110
One of the options open to the Commission is authorizing an
investigation by an ad hoc committee. However, such an investigation can be undertaken "only with the express consent of the State
concerned and shall be conducted in constant cooperation with that
State and under conditions determined by agreement with it," ' and,
as one representative of the Commission described it, the investigations authorized by resolution 1508 "imposed no a priori obligations
on States." 112 It has been clear from the first reference to the working group through the final discussion of the procedure in the Subcommission that the working group would not perform an orthodox
judicial function." 3 Because of the Subcommission's quasi-judicial
nature, the need for protection of the national sovereign is minimal.
An examination of the Subcommission's procedure indicates there
is ample protection for the national sovereign outside of the domestic remedies provision, leaving the door open for a balanced application of the exhaustion rule as part of an effort to create an overall balance in the procedure.
National sovereignty has received general protection in the
United Nations Charter by article two, section seven, prohibiting
consideration of any issue within domestic jurisdiction. 1 4 There is
today a relation between violations of human rights and international
110. 24 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 75.
111. ECOSOC Res. 1503 para. 6(b), supra note 2.
112. 25 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 135, 143.
113. In 1967, the Subcommission recommended that the Commission "adopt an
appropriate method for the gathering, collation and evaluation of relevant information on the violation of human rights." 19 Subcommission, U.N. Doc., E/CN.4/930, at
88, 95. The Commission, in turn, mandated the Subcommission to prepare a report
on violations "from all available sources." 23 Commission on Human Rights, Sum-

mary Report, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 6, at 80, 140, U.N. Doc. E/4322 (Commission
Res. 8 para. 2). The handling of communications by the working group has been described as "sifting." 25 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 144. There has
been objection to the use of words with a judicial overtone, such as "admissibility."
The term has been maintained, but it is understood that it is being used in its generic
sense to mean "a process of selection or screening, and not in its technical sense as
a term of legal art." Id.
114. For a discussion of article 2(7), see Report of the U.N. Commission on the
Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 16-22,
114-19, U.N. Doc. A/2505 & Add. 1 (1953). For a comprehensive bibliography on the
subject, see L. SonN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 9, at 594.
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threats to the peace," 5 which has tended to weaken the force of the
article two argument,1 1 6 but the issue of domestic jurisdiction is
seldom absent from human rights consideration. The debates about
the Subcommission's procedure constantly have referred to itn17 with
the result that the Subcommission will consider only gross and systematic violations of human rights.118
National sovereigns have expressed great concern about the
politically motivated communication. 1 9 The Commission's response
has been to include several provisions in the procedure which deny
admissibility to such communications beyond the exhaustion requirement. There is a provision that nongovernmental organizations may
submit communications, but only if they act in good faith and do
20
not resort to politically motivated stands contrary to the Charter.

115. The debates in the United Nations on South Africa over the years indicate
the evolution of this sentiment. See, e.g., Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees, 1 U.N. GAOR 1 (1946); 7 U.N. GAOR 53 (1952); 15 U.N. SCOR 851
(1960); G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 17, at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
116. See Note, A Proposed Resolution Providing for the Authorization of Intervention by the Member Nations, A Regional Organization, or a Group of States In a
State Committing Gross Violations of Human Rights, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 340, 355-56
(1973).
117. E.g., 24 Subcommmission Report, supra note 1. It also is reflected in certain measures limiting the competence of the Subcommission to "flagrant, massive and
systematic violations," such as found in the policy of apartheid. 25 Subcommission, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR 646, at 136 (1972). It is also appearing in the debates about
the model rules of procedure for ad hoe bodies of the United Nations. E.g., 28 Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. EC/CN.4/1086 (1972).
118. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 22. T. Buergenthal pointed
out the connection between the domestic jurisdiction argument and the large-scale,
systematic nature of violations. Buergenthal, The United Nations and the Development
of Rules Relating to Human Rights, 1965 Abs. Soe'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 132. Humphrey
wrote that the Secretary General suggested in 1946 that the Economic and Social Council give the Commission on Human Rights authority to make recommendations to the
Council on "cases affecting very great numbers of people or having international repercussions." Humphrey, The Right of Petition in the United Nations, 4 REVUE DES
DROITS DE L'HombE 463, 468 (1971). This idea reappeared 22 years later in 24 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22, at 63. Compare the Inter-American Commission's procedure for "individual cases," allowing review of communications only when
they reveal a violation of a very fundamental human right. Statute art. 9(bis) (a),
Regulations art. 53, supranote 8, at 8-10.
119. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 23-24.
120. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 2(a), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1,
at 50. One commentator showed concern that the working group may gradually
obtain far-reaching discretionary powers in these matters. Cassese, supra note 19, at
382. Compare the Inter-American Commission Regulations art. 39, supra note 8, at 6.
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Similar restrictions are made in two other provisions.' 2' Also, anonymous 122 and abusive' 23 communications are inadmissible.

There is another provision, ostensibly directed to the administrative efficiency of the Subcommission, which offers considerable protection to the national sovereign. It requires petitioners to have "direct and reliable knowledge" of the allegations made;124 if their
knowledge is "second hand," the communications must be accompanied by "clear evidence.'1

25

It is apparent from the competence and procedure of the Subcommission described above that the system is weighted in favor of
the national sovereign. However, there are reasons to believe that
the drafters of the resolution establishing the Subcommission's authority to review individual communications intended to create a
balanced system, in general, and a balanced application of the exhaustion requirement, in particular.
First, there is no reference in the domestic remedies provision
to "customary international law.' ' 126 While the rule is most likely
to be applied in accordance with customary international law, the
absence of the specific phrase leaves room for holding that the generalization does not prevail in the Subcommission and its working
group. 27 Second, the time limit for submission of communications
was "purposefully left vague.'1 28 An application need not be sub121. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 1(a), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at
50 ("consistent with the Charter"); id. para. 3(c) at 51 ("manifestly political").
122. Id. para. 2(b), at 51.
123. Id. para. 3(b), at 51.
124. Id. para. 2(a), at 50. The communications also must be "reliably attested."
Id. para. l(b), at 50. Compare European Convention art. 25, supra note 8 ("victim").
125. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 2(c), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1,
at 51. Compare the Inter-American Commission which has no similar provision.
126. Compare Subcommission Res. 1 para. 4, 24 Subcommission Report, supra
note 1, at 51 with European Convention art. 26, supra note 8 and Regulations art. 54,
supra note 8.
127. See note 98 supra. See generally text accompanying notes 85-93 supra. Compare the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 41(1) (a), G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (interstate petitions); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 5(2) (b), supra note 8 (individual petitions); and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, arts 11, 14, supra note 8 (interstate and individual).
128. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 26. This seems to be an implicit
admission of the confusion that often surrounds application of the exhaustion requirement where the independence of the domestic judiciary is in question.

DOMESTIC REMEDIES

mitted within six months of the final decision by domestic authorities as in the European setting,129 but need be only a submission "within
a reasonable time."' 30 Third, there is a notion of a distributive burden of proof in the Subcommission's exhaustion requirement. The
respondent state must produce some evidence and "[a]ny failure to
exhaust remedies should be satisfactorily established."' 31
Finally, the unique position of the individual in a human rights
proceeding has been recognized in the Subcommission. Several members, in 1971, expressed the feeling that "the individual should not
be left defenceless [sic] before an omnipotent State."' 32 Other members observed that
in devising objective criteria on the question of admissibility of communications the Subcommission should adopt a flexible approach,
since most communications, as experience had shown, originated from
individuals who were not familiar with complicated legal procedures
and were often not in a position to "familiarize themselves with such
procedures. Excessive technicality in the format of communications
should not be required. 133
On a more general level, the position of the individual in the Subcommission proceeding has been bolstered by the strong General Assembly resolution which initiated the consideration of a procedure
for handling individual communications. 134 In that resolution the
General Assembly invited the Economic and Social Council and the
Commission on Human Rights "to give urgent consideration to ways
and means of improving the capacity of the United Nations to put
a stop to violations of human rights wherever they may occur."' 35
129. European Convention art. 26, supra note 8.
130. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 5, 24 Subcommission Report, supra 1, at 52.
131. Id. para. 4(b), at 51. E. Schwelb testified that this provision "means that the
burden of proof is on the Government . . . which claims that domestic remedies have
not been exhausted." Hearings, supra note 34, at 273. Another commentator said the
same with regard to the European Convention. J. FAwcETT, supra note 99, at 288-90.
However, neither statement means that the respondent carries a risk of nonpersuasion.
Rather, both indicate that the respondent carries the initial burden of producing evidence that effective remedies exist. The petitioner then must offer prima facie evidence
that the system contains no effective remedies for his particular circumstances. If he
fails to substantiate his claim then the Subcommission will accept less evidence from
the respondent, although paragraph 4(b) places a floor under the amount required.
132. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 19.
133. Id. at 21.
134. G.A. Res. 2144A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
135. Id. para 12, at 47 (emphasis added).
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Given the protection of the national sovereign contained in the
competence and procedure of the Subcommission and given the prevailing desire to assist the individual petitioner, there is good reason to anticipate an equitable application of the domestic remedies
rule. More specifically, it might be expected that the Subcommission will assist the individual victims in meeting the requirement
of proof by assuming an active fact-finding role, keeping the standard
of proof at a low level, and taking a broad-minded approach to examining the quantity of proof.
B. Specific Assistance in Satisfying the Proof Requirement
1. Fact-finding Role. In the United Nations procedure, active
fact-finding is expressly authorized only after the Subcommission has
transferred the case to the Commission on Human Rights. 130 Onsite investigations as a form of active fact-finding, in general, are not
well received by the member states of the United Nations.13 7 Nevertheless, public policy favoring international protection of human
rights would indicate that an exception be made for the Subcommission's procedure. 38 This public policy has found its way into the
procedure of the Inter-American Commission which is authorized to
hear witnesses and conduct on-site investigations prior to making a
decision on the exhaustion requirement. 13 9 The balance of interests
in the overall procedure of the Subcommission is very similar to
that of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; both
organs have broad authorization to gather information, conduct
136. ECOSOC Res. 1503 para. 5, supra note 2, at 8.
137. van Boven, Fact-finding in the Sphere of Human Rights, 3 ISRAEL Y.B. on
HUMAN RIGHTS 93, 108 (1973).
138. The International Conference on Human Rights, which met at Teheran in
April-May 1968, proclaimed that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a
common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community." Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights 3, 4 para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/42. The General Assembly
of the United Nations endorsed the Proclamation of Teheran. G.A. Res. 2442, 23
GAOR, Supp. 18, U.N. Doc. A/7218, at 49. See generally text accompanying notes
89-96 supra.
139. Regulations art. 50, supra note 8, at 8 ("general cases"). The Commission
has interpreted article 50 to authorize examination of information presented by the
parties, the hearing of witnesses and even "observation in loco." See, e.g., X, Y, Z v.
Brazil, Case 1684, OA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at 13, 18 (Inter-Am. Comm'n 1972).
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studies and prepare reports. 140 With regard to specific allegations they
are authorized to demand information from the respondent government,' 4 ' and it is reasonable to go one step further in the parallelism
and allow the Subcommission and its working group to conduct preliminary investigations as is permitted in the Inter-American system.
Before the Subcommission could undertake such an active role,
however, the obstacle presented by the ten-day limit for annual meetings of the working group would have to be overcome.142 This might
be done in either of two ways: since the delineation between the
Subcommission and the working group has never been clear,143 it is

possible to limit the latter to decisions on competence and leave the
former to consider admissibility requirements; 4 4 or a special adjunct
group could be attached to the working group for the purpose of
gathering evidence. 145 Both of these possibilities would be appropriate in light of the protection accorded national sovereignty in other
areas of the Subcommission's procedure.

46

2. Standard of Proof. In customary international law, the appli140. Compare the Subcommission's role (notes 104 & 113 supra), with the role
of the Inter-American Commission (Statute art. 9, supra note 8).
141. Compare Subcommission Res. 1 para. 1(b), supra note 5, at 50, with Regulations art. 51(1), supra note 8, at 8. The latter is certainly the more forceful requirement, in particular due to the provision that the events on which information has been
requested may be presumed to be confirmed if there is no response within 180 days.
The possibility for stronger action in the Subcommission exists in light of a demand
recently made by the Commission on Human Rights to certain governments for documents related to patterns of gross violations relayed from the Subcommission. 30 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report, 56 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 5, at 57, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1154 (1974).
142. ECOSOC Res. 1503, para 1, supra note 2, at 8.
143. See 21 Subcommission, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/976, at 27 (1968).
144. The working group evolved because of the twin concerns in the Commission
on Human Rights about the quantity and quality of evidence considered by the Subcommission before referral to the Commission. See 24 Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 22. The working group could be used to assess the quantity of evidence
and the more qualitative decision could be left to the Subcommission.
145. The Commission on Human Rights recently established a working group
of five to meet one week before the full Commission to "examine" documents transmitted by the Subcommission. 30 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 141, at 34,
58; ef. Regulations arts. 41(1), (2), 49, supra note 8, at 7-8. Note the expanded role assumed by the rapporteur in X, Y, Z v. Brazil, Case 1684, OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.28, at 13 (Inter-Am. Comm'n 1972).
146. Notes 114-25 supra & accompanying text. If nothing can be done to expand
the fact-finding role of the Subcommission and its working group, at least there is a
provision allowing nongovernmental organizations and other groups to assist the aggrieved individual. Subcommission Res. 1 para. 2(a), 24 Subcommission Report, supra
note 1, at 50.
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cant must produce prima facie evidence either that remedies were
attempted to no avail or that no attempt was made because it would
have been futile. The standard for the latter, indirect attack has generated considerable confusion. The prima facie evidence must be sufficient to establish more than "the mere expectation that an injustice
will be done by the courts,"' 147 and yet it need not create a "conviction"
that resort to domestic remedies would be a "useless gesture."' 148 The
standard seems to be that the insufficiency of the remedy system must
149
be "at least convincingly demonstrated."'
Until recently, the European Commission on Human Rights
sought "conclusive," rather than "convincing," proof of futility where
the source being used for the indirect attack was administrative acts
causing substantive injuries. Prima facie evidence was not adequate
in those instances and "substantiated" evidence was necessary. 15
Recently, however, there have been indications' 51 that the standard
has been lowered slightly, although the matter remains very much
in dispute. 52 The Inter-American Commission, on the other hand,
147. A. FREEMAN, supra note 6, at 421.

148. Id.
149. The middle ground standard was established in the Finnish Ships Case (Finland v. Great Britain), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1479, 1501-02 (1934). The arbitrator held that
the claimant must prove that attempts at remedies would be "obviously futile." According to one authority, in order to prove that an attempt would be obviously futile
it is necessary that the insufficiency of the remedy be "conclusively, or at least convincingly, demonstrated." J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 114 (1959).
150. In the First Greek Case, [1968] Y.B. EuR. CONV. ON HUIAN RIGHTS 690,
the Commission accepted prima facie evidence of administrative acts that openly interfered with the domestic remedies in granting an exception and ignored prima facie
evidence of a pattern of torture. In the Second Greek Case, 34 COLL. OF DECISIONS
EUR. COMm'N HUMAN RIGHTS 64 (1970), the Commission granted an exception
largely because of the substantiated evidence of torture carried over from the decision
on the merits in the First Greek Case. It added that "the present allegations . . ., if
" Id. at
substantiated, must be considered as further proof of practice of torture ....

74. This indicates that prima facie evidence alone will not suffice.
151. In Donnelly v. the United Kingdom, 43 COLL. OF DECISIONS BUR. CoMIs'N
HUMAN IGHTS 122, 147 (1973), the Commission wrote that each applicant must
submit "evidence, prima facie substantiating both the existence of an administrative
practice ... and his claim to be a victim of acts part of the practice .... ." Two commentators wrote that based on Donnelly "it would appear likely that henceforth the
prima facie standard will be applied ..

. ."

Boyle & Hannum, supra note 78, at 451.

They added, "[it would seem that the prima facie standard would normally be met by
a lower level of proof than 'substantial evidence.' " Id.
152. In the Donnelly case, the Commission indicated a possible lowering of the
standard of proof with regard to an administrative practice. However, the holding of
the case was not based on that lower standard. There was well-substantiated secondary
evidence offered by the seven applicants which was beyond their personal experience.
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has been satisfied with prima facie evidence that "convincingly"
1 53
demonstrates the futility of attempting domestic remedies.
Prima facie evidence is adequate for the Subcommission and
its working group. The sole indication of a standard of proof in the
Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 is contained in the provision that instructs the working group to bring to the attention of
the Subcommission only those communications "which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of
human rights."'15 4 The debates in the Subcommission relating to procedure indicate that the term "appear" requires examination of only
those communications which "might" reveal a consistent pattern of
gross violations."' 155
Based on these indications, it appears that the prima facie evidence must "convincingly" demonstrate futility or at least establish
an "expectation" of futility, a standard favorable to the individual
victim.
3. Quantity of Proof. Where the balance of interest in an international body favors national sovereignty, each source of evidence for
the indirect attack is treated in isolation. One source, by itself, must
satisfy the requirement of proof if an exception to the domestic remedies rule is to be granted. This rigid formalism is a clear example
of the dangers inherent in losing sight of the forest for the trees.
The exhaustion requirement is based on the presumption that
there are effective domestic remedies available to claimants. 5 6 An
attack on the presumption is aimed at establishing that the respondent
state falls below a recognized minimum standard of respect for the
right of individuals to obtain domestic relief. 57 In his analysis of the
The evidence was contained in a report published by a department within the respondent
government, which detailed acts of torture against 40 individuals, none of whom was
a petitioner. This substantiated evidence made it relatively easy for the Commission to
grant the seven applicants an exception.
153. X, Y, Z v. Brazil, Case 1684, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at 13 (Inter-Am.
Conu'n 1972). The rapporteur reported to the full Commission just prior to the decision on admissibility that the evidence was prima facie and that an exception to the
exhaustion requirement was necessary. Id. at 18.
154. ECOSOC Res. 1503 para. 1, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added); see Subcommission Res. 1 para. 1 (b), 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 50.
155. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 21.
156. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
157. See Garcia-Amador, (First) Report on International Responsibility, [1956]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COAM'N 173, 199-203, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/96 (1956).
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Montano case, 58 A. V. Freeman observed that the performance of the
respondent state disclosed "an administration of governmental functions so far below the level of international requirements as to make
the State answerable."' 59 The logical method for examining the overall
performance of the respondent state is to combine the evidence from
the various sources and, when the cumulative effect falls below "the
level of international requirements," the presumption should be discarded and the exception granted.
An international tribunal in the R. E. Brown case'60 proceeded
in this manner on a claim against the government in South Africa
just prior to annexation by Great Britain. The decision left uncertain whether the substantive offense or one of the other sources
used by the complainant was the major factor in making an exception to the exhaustion requirement; it was clear, however, that all
the sources were necessary as the tribunal held that "all three branches
of the government conspired to ruin [the claimant's] enterprise."' 01
The Inter-American Commission engages in a similar pooling in its
12
-determination of "general" cases.
The European Commission, on the other hand, takes a completely different approach. Rather than examine the forest (the overall governmental performance), they carefully analyze the trees (each
separate source of evidence) contained in the group petition. Where
judicial and legislative sources are involved, this approach makes no
difference, but where evidence of administrative acts is used and a
pattern is required, the approach is critical. 10 For example, in the
Second Cyprus case, 164 the Commission ignored prima facie evidence
of 49 cases of torture and nine cases of denial of access to information essential to a domestic cause of action in refusing to grant an
exception to 20 petitioners who were in prison. The petitioners had
158. Montano Case (Peru v. United States) (1863), MOORE, DIGEST 1630.
159. A. FREEmAN, supra note 6, at 418.
160. R.E. Brown Case (United States v. the United Kingdom) (1925), 6
U.N.R.I.A.A. 120 (1923).
161. Id. at 129.
162. The submission in X, Y, Z v. Brazil, Case 1684, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.28, at
13 (Inter-Am. Comm'n 1972), contained reference to three different articles allegedly
violated by the respondent. Evidence was offered with regard to arbitrary arrest and
denial of due process in addition to torture. See Sklar, supra note 83. The final decision
by the Commission, however, spoke only of torture. X, Y, Z v. Brazil, supra at 21.
163. See generally text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
164. The Second Cyprus Case [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUAMAN RIOHTS 186.
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the information necessary to bring a cause of action but failed to attempt the remedy. 165 The Commisssion considered this failure inexcusable and relied upon the fact that the attorney general had not
yet denied a remedy to anyone who knew the name of the author of
the alleged torture. 166 The issue should not have been the action of
the attorney general, but the performance of the whole government,
including the prison officials standing between the petitioners and
the attorney general. The experience of the other petitioners in the
package would have been instructive if the Commission had taken
the eclectic approach to consideration of the exhaustion requirement.
It should have been clear that the government in Cyprus was performing below the acceptable standard and no longer deserved the strong
167
presumption given it by the Commission.
The United Nations approaches the task of protecting human
rights differently from the European Commission. It originally
gathered very general information about human rights and published periodical reports, but recently it has decided to focus greater
attention on specific violations of human rights as a source of information about the performance of member states. 68s Specific remedies
were not, and still are not, the principal intent behind the collection of communications; 69 this is in contrast to the European Commission which has received applications primarily with specific reme70
dies in mind.
Before 1970-71, when the present United Nations procedure was
established, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities was authorized to prepare a report on vio165. See note 59 supra& accompanying text.

166. The Second Cyprus Case, [1958-59] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
186, 192.
167. The Commission no doubt had a great deal of respect for the British system
of justice, even the transplant of that system in Cyprus. As a result, it focused on the
central government, which was controlled by the British authorities. It found the system
of remedies at that level effective and adequate. Apparently, the acts of torture at the
lower levels, where British control was in question, were irrelevant in the eyes of the
Commission to the examination of the remedy system.
168. See L. SoHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 9, at 739-841.
169. See notes 104 & 113 supra. Even under ECOSOC Res. 1503, supra note 2,
the Subcommission is to consider communications and other relevant information and
then refer "situations," not "cases," to the Commission on Human Rights. Id. para. 5,
at 9.
170. See notes 104 & 113 supra.
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lations based on information "from all available sources."'u 7 Economic
and Social Council Resolution 1503 subsequently focused attention
more on the individual petitions, but the Subcommission and its working group were still mandated to consider the communications "and
other relevant information."1 72 It would be totally inconsistent for
the Subcommission to take an eclectic approach in the performance of
its overall function of gathering information that might indicate situations potentially threatening to international peace' 7 and, at the
same time, to ignore the eclectic approach in consideration of the exhaustion requirement. If the Subcommission is to engage in this inconsistency, the breadth of the evidence available for the indirect attack will be limited to communications 1 4 but there still will be opportunity for the eclectic approach; the working group will be able
to draw on communications outside the consistent pattern immediately under consideration for evidence about the domestic remedy system.
The Subcommission should not concern itself with the dimensions of 'the pattern of administrative acts being used in the indirect
attack. Rather, it should look at all of the evidence offered by the
petitioners in the package claim and judge the overall performance of
the respondent government. The eye should remain fixed on the
forest.
In summary, some of the specific gains expected to grow out of
the overall balance of interests in the Subcommission's procedure are
very likely to appear; these are greater fact-finding, a lower standard
of proof, and an eclectic approach to the quantity of proof. In addition to the contextual application of the exhaustion requirement,
171. 23 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 113, at 80.
172. ECOSOC Res. 1503 para. 5, supra note 2, at 8-9.
173. See note 177 infra.

174. It is possible the inconsistency was intended, in light of the failure of the
Subcommission to include the phrase "other relevant information" in its resolution
which described the procedure for dealing with the question of admissibility of communications. Subcommission Res. 1, 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 50.
However, the ECOSOC resolution did not require the omission. ECOSOC Res. 1503
para. 5, supra note 2, at 8-9. The phrase was added to the draft resolution that
bventually became ECOSOC Resolution 1503 by the Commission on Human Rights
because it lacked confidence in the completeness of individual communications and
wanted to allow the Subcommission to add corroborative evidence from other sources
Eefore referring the matter to the Commission. 25 Commission on Human Rights, supra
note 22, at 145. That same evidence should be allowed to support the requests of individuals for an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
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these gains will greatly assist the individual complainant in meeting
the proof requirement.
C. The Possibilityof an Automatic Exception
If the exhaustion requirement is applied to each petition separately and not in the context of the package, the injured individual
will be faced with the same difficulties as claimants in traditional
international law and, to a lesser degree, applicants before the European Commission. However, application of the rule to packages of
communications might create a serious imbalance unfavorable to the
sovereign, especially if there is active fact finding and/or a low standard of proof and an eclectic approach to the quantity of proof. This
possibility is urgently suggested by those who believe that whenever
there is a consistent pattern of gross violations, there can be no effective domestic remedies and, therefore, an exception to the rule will
be automatic. 175 Since it must be assumed that there is some rationale
for the existence of the exhaustion requirement in the procedure, the
argument continues, the contexual application is not possible.
All of the reasons stated above for relaxing the exhaustion requirement to the benefit of the individual petitioner could be used to
argue against any exhaustion requirement at all.17 6 However, given
the fact the requirement has already been placed in the procedure, its
purpose cannot be totally eliminated by interpretation. There are
three principal reasons to believe that the exception would not be applied to the packages automatically. First, despite the arguments about
domestic jurisdiction, a consistent pattern of gross violations is not
equated to an actual threat to international peace, but only to a potential threat. 7 7 This means that a consistent pattern is not accom175. Compare Boyle & Hannum, supra note 78, who anticipated criticism of the
Donnelly case to the effect that any pattern of administrative acts would lead to an
exception from the exhaustion requirement. They responded that there would be no
such problem because "most alleged violations of human rights [before the European
Commission] will continue to involve only one individual.

..

."

Id. at 452. They also

suggested the possibility of limiting any such exceptions to cases involving torture. Id.
at 453.
176. There were five votes for deletion of the entire domestic remedies provision
from the Subcommission's procedure. 24 Subcommission Report, supra note 1, at 30
(the vote was 5-14-4). See also P. DROST, supra note 14, at 118-19.
177. Violations of human rights that are a "threat to international peace" are a
matter of international concern and no longer exclusively within domestic jurisdiction.
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panied by the pressure for admission that might attend if it were to
,represent an actual threat. Second, a consistent pattern of gross violations does not have to be as comprehensive as apartheid, an example of a consistent pattern that was closely associated with earlier
procedures in the Subcommission. 178 Since nowhere is it required
that a package include a variety of different gross violations (such as
arbitrary arrest, denial of the right to a fair trial, and torture), the
package petitions will not contain the wealth" of evidence that there
would be if the consistent pattern of gross violations had to be on the
order of apartheid.
Third, there are at least eight variables in determining a consistent pattern of gross violations: 1) the type of substantive offenses
(for example, torture or arbitrary arrest); 2) the nature of the attack on the presumption (indirect or direct); 3) the source of evidence for the attack (judicial, legislative, executive or substantive);
4) the strength of the presumption that the respondent government
is capable of rendering justice; 5) the fact-finding role taken; 6) the
standard of proof; 7) the approach taken to the quantity of proof;
and 8) the prevailing view of the consistent pattern of gross violations
as a threat to international peace. With all these variables, there is no
assurance that evidence of a consistent pattern of gross violations will
contain sufficient proof of a government policy to deny justice
justifying an exception to the domestic remedies requirement.

CONCLUSION

At the 28th session of the Commission on Human Rights in
1972, some members stressed the importance of the procedures devised
Also, if the violations are "likely to impair. . . friendly relations among nations," they
are an international concern. U.N. CHARTER art. 27. See generally Hearings, supra
note 34, at 8. As the standard for overcoming the domestic jurisdiction provision of the
United Nations Charter, article 2(7), is reduced from an actual "threat" to an "impairment of friendly relations," the requirements of a consistent pattern of gross violations will also be lowered. The article 14 avenue for the United Nations action relates to matters which represent a potential threat to international peace. In discussing the South Africa issue, some United Nations agencies have varied the requirement
for overcoming article 2(7) from one end of this potential-actual spectrum to the
other. See note 115 supra.
178. See 24 Commission on Human Rights, supra note 22; 23 Commission on
Human Rights, supra note 113.
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by the Subcommission.' 9 They considered that the ambiguities and
the obvious flexibility of the procedure offered opportunities for the
work of the Subcommission to acquire "new dimensions."' 0 It is the
conclusion of this Comment that the new dimensions must include:
1) contextual application of the exhaustion requirement to packages
-to consistent patterns; and 2) indirect attack by means of evidence
of patterns of judicial precedents, legislative measures and administrative acts related to the judicial system, and substantive offenses.
Without such dimensions, the basic rationale behind the individual
petition will be left unfulfilled.
HUGH I. MANKE
179. 28 Commission on Human Rights, Summary Report, 52 ECOSOC, Supp. 7,
at 37, U.N. Doc. E/5113 (1972).
180. Id.

